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XXIII. Scotland
Martin Hogg
A. Legislation
1. Damages (Scotland) Bill
1The Damages (Scotland) Bill addresses certain matters relating to awards
of damages for wrongful death. The current law is found mainly in the
Damages (Scotland) Act 1976 (the principal parts of which will be re-
enacted in the proposed Bill), a statute to which the Scottish Law Commis-
sion recommended amendment in its Report on Damages for Wrongful
Death (2008). Many of those recommendations are given effect to in the
terms of the Bill, though some proved sufficiently controversial to be
excluded during Parliamentary progress of the Bill (see discussion below).
Though the Damages (Scotland) Bill is a Member’s rather than a Govern-
ment Bill, its broad aims are supported by the Scottish Government.
2The Bill proposes a number of changes to the current law, among them the
following:
(a) as regards the rights of a victim who is still alive but who is likely to die
earlier than he or she would have, as a result of the injury sustained,
the Bill proposes changes to the way in which such a victim’s claim for
future patrimonial loss is to be calculated. In assessing what sum is to
be awarded to the victim, an amount has always been deducted to
represent what would have been the victim’s reasonable living ex-
penses during the period by which life has been foreshortened. Pre-
viously this figure has been left to the court to calculate; the Bill
proposes a new method, adopting a fixed figure of 25 % of the victim’s
projected net income during the foreshortened period. During debate
on the Bill, this inflexible single rate deduction was criticised by some
as too inflexible and therefore, at Stage 2 of the Parliamentary pro-
ceedings, a caveat to the provision was added providing that, if the
court considers that a ‘manifestly and materially unfair’ result would
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be produced by application of the fixed percentage, it may apply a
percentage reduction other than 25 %.
(b) as regards claims by a qualifying relative of a deceased person for
damages for loss of financial support, the Bill proposes that, where
the person making the claim is the deceased’s spouse, civil partner,
cohabitant or dependent child, the deceased should be taken to have
used 75 % of his or her net income to support his or her family, and the
income of the person making the claim should be ignored entirely
(such figure of 75 % may, following amendment to the Bill, be varied
by the court if to apply it would lead to a ‘manifestly and materially
unfair’ result). Another change relating to the calculation of loss of
financial support by relatives relates to the use of a multiplier in
calculating the claim. Compensation for future loss of earnings is
currently based on the product of (i) the victim’s net earnings at the
time of the injury, and (ii) a ‘multiplier’, that being a figure taken from
tables of actuarial data known as the ‘Ogden Tables’. At present a
multiplier is applied from the date of death, not from the date of the
proof (ie the date of the main court hearing). However, clause 7 of the
Bill creates a distinction between past loss and future loss and further
provides that a multiplier should be applied from the date of the court
order awarding damages in respect of future loss only.
(c) as regards relatives’ claims for non-patrimonial loss, the Bill provides
that such a claim should in future be called a ‘loss of society award’,
such award being for emotions ordinarily experienced on the death of
a loved one and for loss of non-patrimonial benefits that might have
derived from the deceased’s society and guidance. The wording of the
proposed provision makes it clear that any mental illness suffered by a
relative as a result of the deceased’s death will have to form the
substance of a distinct legal claim.
3 The Bill as originally presented had also proposed restricting the category
of persons entitled to claim patrimonial damages in respect of wrongful
death: the proposed new rule would have limited the class to a spouse or
civil partner (or one who lived with the deceased as if in such a relation-
ship), a parent or child (or one who accepted the deceased as a child of the
family, or was accepted by the deceased as a child of the family), a brother
or sister (or one who grew up in the same household as the deceased, and
was accepted as if a child of the family in which the deceased was a child),
or a grandparent or grandchild. This proved controversial however, so the
decision was taken at the Second Reading of the Bill to reinstate those
relatives of the deceased currently entitled to claim (ascendants or descen-
Martin Hogg
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dants, aunts or uncles, nieces or nephews, and former spouses or civil
partners of the deceased).
4(Shortly before the Yearbook went to press, the Bill was enacted and
brought into force as the Damages (Scotland) Act 2011. Reference will be
made in next year’s Yearbook to the final form which the legislation, in
force from 7 July 2011, took.)
B. Cases
1. Trustees of the WTL International Ltd Retirement Benefit Scheme v
Edwards [2010] Court of Session Outer House (CSOH) 34:
Professional Negligence; Negligent Advice; Causation of Loss
a) Brief Summary of the Facts
5The pursuers, trustees of a pension scheme, sought damages for breach of
contract and negligence in respect of alleged negligent advice given by the
defender in relation to the switching of assets of the pension scheme from
a deferred annuity contract with Scottish Widows plc to a managed fund
contract with the same party. The pursuers alleged that the defender
failed to give an impartial and balanced assessment of the advantages
and disadvantages of the switch, and failed to give a detailed analysis of
the options.
b) Judgment of the Court
6The judge (Lord Hodge) held (i) that the pursuers had failed to establish
that the defender had been negligent, and furthermore (ii) that the court
was not satisfied that the pursuers had established that, but for the advice
which they had been given, they would not have acted as they did in any
event, and that therefore the pursuers had failed to establish a causal con-
nection between the loss alleged and any breach of duty by the defender.
c) Commentary
7Although the judge held that a causal link had not been established
between the harmful conduct and the alleged losses, he also added some
further obiter remarks on the question of whether there should be a dif-
ference in the court’s approach to causation in a case of negligently giving
Scotland
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of wrong advice and a case of negligent failure to advise (see para 77 f).
Causation is not (says Lord Hodge uncontroversially) simply ‘a matter of
common sense’: one has to look to the law to decide what losses are held to
have been caused by a particular kind of breach of duty (para 78). More
controversially, however, Lord Hodge goes on to question the utility of the
distinction – drawn by Lord Hoffmann in the famous case of South
Australia Asset Management v York Montague1 – between a failure to advise
and the giving of incorrect advice: such a distinction ‘may often be elusive
in a particular case. It does not form the sound basis for different rules on
causation.’ (para 79). In relation to the giving of negligent advice or
information, what is important is that a court should consider the coun-
terfactual question of ‘what would have been the advice or information
which [the defender] would have given if he had performed his task with
reasonable care’ (para 79).
8 The judge’s remarks noted above are obiter. Nonetheless, they cannot be
allowed to stand without some comment. First, in the interests of fairness,
it should be noted that Lord Hoffmann was not suggesting in the South
Australia case that different rules of causation should apply to cases of
failure to advise and negligent advice: he was merely pointing out that it is
necessary to consider the nature of the duty undertaken by a defendant in
order to discover what types of loss can properly be considered to have
flowed from the breach of duty in question. Second, the suggestion by
Lord Hodge that, in cases of failure to advise competently, one must
consider what advice would have been given had the defender been acting
competently, glosses over the problem that there may be a number of
reasonable and competent counterfactual courses of action that a defender
might have advised: how is one to choose between them?2
1 [1997] Appeal Cases (AC) 191.
2 This difficulty is discussed further in a chapter by M Hogg entitled ‘Developing Causal
Doctrine’ in: R Goldberg (ed), Perspectives on Causation (Oxford: Hart Publishing, forth-
coming October 2011).
Martin Hogg
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2. Farstad Supply AS v Enviroco Ltd [2010] United Kingdom
Supreme Court (UKSC) 18, 2010 Scots Law Times (SLT) 994:
Contribution amongWrongdoers Applicable in Theory to
Third Party, but Third Party’s Liability can be Excluded
under Contract with Injured Party
a) Brief Summary of the Facts
9In the first of two Scottish delict cases to come before the Supreme Court
in 2010, the owners of an oil rig supply vessel sued the defenders, a
company engaged to clean the hold of the vessel, for damages for loss
caused by a fire allegedly started negligently by the defenders. The
defenders claimed that, assuming any negligence on their part, the fire
was materially contributed to by the negligence of the owners and of the
third party (charterers of the vessel). On the assumption, therefore, that
the defenders were liable to the owners, they sought a contribution from
the third party under sec 3(2) of the Law ReformMiscellaneous Provisions
(Scotland) Act 1940, that subsection stating that: ‘Where any person has
paid any damages or expenses in which he has been found liable …, he
shall be entitled to recover from any other person who, if sued, might also
have been held liable in respect of the loss or damage on which the action
was founded, such contribution, if any, as the court may deem just.’ It was
argued for the third party that (i) the relevant provision of the 1940 Act
was not intended to extend to third-party contributions; and (ii) in any
event, even if it were, the charterparty contract between it and the owner
excluded any liability for the loss arising in the action and that therefore it
was not a party who ‘if sued, might also have been held liable’ for the loss
(as required by sec 3(2) of the Act).
b) Judgment of the Court
10The Supreme Court held that (1) while sec 3 of the 1940 Act was drafted in
such a way that it seemed to envisage the question of a contribution
towards damages arising in circumstances where there were two actions
(the second being a claim by the party found liable in the first action to a
contribution from a joint wrongdoer), the application of the section was
not limited to such a case and it was perfectly capable of applying in
circumstances where a contribution was claimed from a third party to an
action; (2) the question to be answered, so far as the third party was
concerned, was therefore whether, if the third party had been sued by the
pursuers, it would have been liable, this depending on whether the third
Scotland
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party would have had a defence to the pursuers’ claim under the charter-
party; and (3) the effect of the relevant provision of the charterparty was to
exclude the charterer’s liability in respect of damage to the vessel caused
by its own negligence and it followed therefore that the defenders were
not entitled to any contribution from the third party under the 1940 Act
because they could not establish that, ‘if sued’, the latter might have been
liable to the pursuers in respect of the fire damage. The Supreme Court
thus excluded the third party from any potential contribution to damages,
and remitted the matter back to the judge at first instance to consider the
pursuers’ claim against the defenders.
c) Commentary
11 The 1940 Act was a significant piece of legislation amending the prior
common law rule on the apportionment of damages between wrongdoers,
which had been to the effect that each joint wrongdoer was liable inter se to
pay a pro rata share of the damages, and that such pro rata share might be
claimed by one wrongdoer from another. The new position introduced
under the Act was of (as Lord Clarke put it in his judgment) ‘a flexible rule
of apportionment according to the court’s view of what was just’. How-
ever, the Act did not address the two matters considered in this appeal –
whether the relevant provision extended to claims for contribution from
third parties (it does, says the Supreme Court), and whether, in applying
the rule, a court may (if the matter is raised) consider an exclusion clause
in a contract between C (the person from whom a contribution is sought)
and A (the pursuer) whichmight permit C to defend a claim by A in respect
of the harm and thereby exclude any claim by B (a defender) for a con-
tribution by C (a court may do so, says the Supreme Court). The judgment
of the Supreme Court thus brings significant clarity to two issues which
had hitherto been undecided in the law.
3. Davis v Catto [2010] CSOH 93: ex turpi causa non oritur actio – Not
Pleadable by Third Party in Damages Contribution Claim by
Defender
a) Brief Summary of the Facts
12 The pursuer was injured in an accident when a car driven dangerously by
the defender crashed. In an action for damages by the pursuer, the defend-
er claimed a contribution towards any damages payable from the third
Martin Hogg
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party, a driver of another dangerously driven vehicle which was immedi-
ately in front of the defender’s car at the time of the accident. The third
party claimed that, because the defender had himself been driving dan-
gerously at the time of the accident, the defender was prevented from
asking for any contribution towards the damages due to the pursuer,
because of the delictual rule ex turpi causa non oritur actio (‘from a disgrace-
ful cause, no action arises’).
b) Judgment of the Court
13The court held that the third party was not exempt from contributing to
damages, the ex turpi causa defence being pleadable only in respect of a
claim made by a pursuer, and not in respect of a claim for a contribution
towards damages made by a defender against a third party. The third
party was required to pay 20 % of the damages due to the pursuer.
c) Commentary
14The ex turpi causa rule is an established rule of Scots law that is commonly
applied in damages claims to prevent one party engaged with another in
jointly committing an unlawful activity from claiming damages from the
other in respect of injuries sustained during the commission of the
activity. The rule reflects a public policy against claims by wrongdoers
for injuries sustained by them during the commission of the wrong. The
rule has, for instance, previously been applied in cases where a thief is
injured when a stolen car driven by his accomplice crashes, though it does
not prevent claims in other sorts of case where the moral turpitude is very
minor (as it was in Weir v Wyper,3 where the turpitude of the injured
pursuer was knowledge on her part that the driver of a car in which she
was a passenger held only a provisional driving licence). As the judge in
the present case noted however, precedent goes only so far as to show that
the rule can be pled as a defence against a party seeking to recover dam-
ages: there is no authority for its application in cases where it is pled by a
third party against a defender. As the judge commented: ‘The third party
is attempting to evade his liability to the pursuer by his invocation of the
maxim against a joint wrongdoer. That is not a proper application of the
maxim, particularly when the maxim is rooted in public policy’ (para 49).
3 1992 SLT 579.
Scotland
529
Brought to you by | provisional account
Unauthenticated | 129.215.19.194
Download Date | 7/14/14 4:17 PM
The judgment seems entirely correct. While it might seem unpalatable
that wrongdoer A should seek a contribution towards damages from fel-
low wrongdoer B in order to reduce A’s liability for those damages, to
prevent such a claim by A against B might prejudice the wholly innocent
injured party’s claim to damages, a result which the public policy under-
pinning the ex turpi causa rule would not support.
15 It is worth noting that, while the ex turpi causa rule was held inapplicable
in this case, it was successfully pled in a later judgment from 2010,
Anderson v Hameed.4 In that case the rule was held to prevent the pursuer
claiming for injuries sustained by him as a passenger in a car accident
because he knew that the defender, the driver of the car, was aged only 16
at the time of the accident, and thus in possession of neither a valid
driving licence nor insurance cover.
4. McLeod v Crawford [2010] CSOH 101, 2010 SLT 1035: Solicitor
Owed noDuty of Care to Family of Deceased Client Regarding
Negligent Advice Given to Client
a) Brief Summary of the Facts
16 The defender, a solicitor, entered into negotiations on behalf of his client
concerning a personal injury claim in respect of exposure to asbestos at the
client’s workplace. An offer to settle the claim was made by the employer’s
insurers on the basis either of (i) a full final payment of £10,000, or
(ii) provisional damages of £5,000 (under this second option, further
losses might subsequently have been claimed if the pursuer had gone on
to contract mesothelioma, which in this case he had). The solicitor relayed
only the full and final settlement offer to his client, this being accepted by
the client. Following the death of the client as a result of mesothelioma,
the pursuers (the widow and children of the deceased) discovered what
had happened and sued the defender and his fellow business partners for
being unable to claim damages in respect of the mesothelioma, the ac-
ceptance of the full and final offer having precluded such a claim. The
defender argued that he was under no duty of care towards the widow and
children in respect of any negligence on his part.
4 [2010] CSOH 99, 20 July 2010.
Martin Hogg
530
Brought to you by | provisional account
Unauthenticated | 129.215.19.194
Download Date | 7/14/14 4:17 PM
b) Judgment of the Court
17The court held that the defender owed no duty of care towards the widow
and children of the deceased in respect of his failure properly to advise his
client of the alternative offer. The claim was therefore dismissed.
c) Commentary
18The judgment is a significant one, as it touches on the same issue as was
raised in the seminal House of Lords judgment White v Jones.5 There is
significant discussion of that case by the judge (Lord Woolman) inMcLeod.
The House of Lords in theWhite case had held that a solicitor had assumed
a responsibility in tort to the daughters of his deceased client in respect of
the negligent performance of his professional duties to the client. That
judgment had evident parallels with the case before Lord Woolman: why
then did his Lordship think that the defender in the case before him had
not assumed any duty towards the widow and children of his deceased
client? Lord Woolman cited a number of reasons: (i) unlike White, the
circumstances of this case might have revealed a conflict of interest
between the deceased and his family, were careful advice to have been
given; (ii) there was no proximity between the defender and the pursuers,
because, unlike the case of the disappointed beneficiaries in White, an ill
effect to family members would not necessarily accrue through breach of
duty in a case such as this – on the contrary, had the defender died of
natural causes, the acceptance of a full and final settlement by the
deceased would have been beneficial to such family members; and (iii) a
duty such as that argued for, requiring a solicitor to consider the possible
effect of his actions upon the family of his client, ‘would result in a
mushrooming of potential liability’ (the very spectre of indeterminate
liability rejected as arising in White). Of these three stated reasons, the
first two seem soundly based, the third perhaps less so: the point, surely,
about the spectre of ‘indeterminate liability’ is that the class of those
making claims, and thus the extent of overall liability, must be uncertain,
whereas in this case it was quite clear that, while a finding of liability
would lead to an increase in claims, this would only be by the limited class
of person allowed to claim in respect of the wrongful death of a relative.
Despite this minor criticism, the overall result in McLeod should be wel-
5 [1995] AC 207.
Scotland
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comed, for reasons that have been advanced elsewhere against the sound-
ness of theWhite v Jones decision.6
5. Morrison Sports Ltd v Scottish Power [2010] UKSC 37, 2010 SLT
1027, (2010) 1 Weekly Law Reports (WLR) 1934: Electricity
Suppliers not Liable at Common Law for Fire Damage
Resulting from a Breach of their Duties under Statutory
Regulations
a) Brief Summary of the Facts
19 In the second of the two cases to come before the Supreme Court, the
owners of premises raised an action against suppliers of electricity in
respect of work undertaken by one of their employees on the electricity
supply system at the premises, such faulty work resulting in a fire which
destroyed the premises. The owners argued that the work was both
negligent at common law as well as in breach of various provisions of the
Electricity Supply Regulations 1988. The defenders argued that the statu-
tory branch of the claim should be dismissed, as a simple breach of the
regulations, of itself and irrespective of carelessness, did not give rise to
any civil liability. At first instance, the Lord Ordinary allowed both
branches of the case to proceed. On appeal to the Inner House of the Court
of Session this decision was upheld. The defenders further appealed to the
Supreme Court.
b) Judgment of the Court
20 The Supreme Court overturned the decision of the Inner House, holding
that Parliament had intended no private right of action to arise for breach
of the 1988 Regulations. Looked at as a whole, the legislative scheme, with
its carefully worked out provisions for various forms of enforcement on
behalf of the public, pointed against individuals having a private right of
action for damages for contraventions of regulations made under it. This
conclusion was reinforced by the fact that it was difficult to identify any
limited class of the public for whose protection the 1988 Regulations were
enacted, and on whom Parliament had intended to confer a private right
of action for breach thereof. The Court therefore dismissed the case so far
6 SeeM Hogg, Obligations (2nd edn 2006) paras 3.113–3.120.
Martin Hogg
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as based upon breach of statutory duty, and remitted the common law case
to the court at first instance for determination.
c) Commentary
21In this decision, the Supreme Court had to revisit a difficult question
which had troubled the House of Lords before it on a number of occasions:
if a statute (or subordinate legislation) imposes obligations on a public or
private body, but omits to state whether a breach of those regulations is
privately actionable by a member of the public suffering harm as a result
of such breach, should a private action be permitted for any such harm
caused? That question had been considered authoritatively by the House
of Lords in X v Bedfordshire County Council,7 in which proceedings Lord
Browne-Wilkinson had summed up the proper approach to be taken as
follows:
The basic proposition is that in the ordinary case a breach of statutory
duty does not, by itself, give rise to any private law cause of action.
However a private law cause of action will arise if it can be shown, as a
matter of construction of the statute, that the statutory duty was
imposed for the protection of a limited class of the public and that
Parliament intended to confer on members of that class a private right
of action for breach of the duty. There is no general rule by reference to
which it can be decided whether a statute does create such a right of
action but there are a number of indicators. If the statute provides no
other remedy for its breach and the Parliamentary intention to protect a
limited class is shown, that indicates that there may be a private right of
action since otherwise there is no method of securing the protection the
statute was intended to confer. If the statute does provide some other
means of enforcing the duty that will normally indicate that the
statutory right was intended to be enforceable by those means and not
by private right of action…However, the mere existence of some other
statutory remedy is not necessarily decisive. It is still possible to show
that on the true construction of the statute the protected class was
intended by Parliament to have a private remedy. Thus the specific
duties imposed on employers in relation to factory premises are en-
forceable by an action for damages, notwithstanding the imposition by
the statutes of criminal penalties for any breach…8
7 [1995] 2 AC 633.
8 [1995] 2 AC 633, 731 f.
Scotland
533
Brought to you by | provisional account
Unauthenticated | 129.215.19.194
Download Date | 7/14/14 4:17 PM
22 The Supreme Court pointed out in this case that the Inner House had
erred in applying these guiding rules: it had concluded that, because in
sec 29(3) of the Electricity Act 1989, a provision dealing with statutory
fines for anyone breaching the 1988 Regulations, the subsection con-
cluded by stating that ‘nothing in the subsection shall affect any liability
of any such person to pay compensation in respect of any damage or
injury which may have been caused by the contravention’, these words
indicated that Parliament had intended to reserve to such injured per-
sons a right to sue at common law for any such damage or injury. But
Lord Rodger, delivering the judgment of the Court, pointed out that
sec 27(5) already made provision for private law claims in respect of
losses caused by breach of other provisions under the legislative scheme
(though not of the provisions relating to the action before the Court), and
noted that ‘where Parliament has made specific provision of this kind…,
the natural inference is that it does not intend there to be a right to
damages or compensation for loss or injury caused by other breaches of
the statute or of subordinate legislation for which no such specific
provision is made’ (para 13).
23 The difficulty with determining the correct result in cases such as these
stems, of course, from ambiguity created by inadequate statutory drafting:
a properly drafted statute would explain whether or not private liability in
delict was applicable in the case of the breach of particular statutory
provisions or not. While, on one view, a statutory provision providing for
criminal fines for its breach which adds that ‘nothing in the subsection
shall affect any liability of any such person to pay compensation in respect
of any damage or injury which may have been caused by the contraven-
tion’ might be taken to be suggesting that Parliament is at least hinting
that a private law right to compensation may exist, the Supreme Court
took the opposite, more cautious view, holding that any liability for
compensation hinted at in the section was only as to possible statutory
liability which may or may not be provided for (para 27):
it does not follow [from the wording of sec 29(3)] that Parliament is
saying that someone who contravenes any provision of any regulations
made under the section is automatically liable to pay compensation for
any resulting damage or injury. Rather, it will all depend on the terms
of the regulations which the Secretary of State decides to make …
[S]ection 29(3) simply provides that, if in terms of any regulations
made under the section a person is to be liable to pay compensation
for damage or injury caused by a contravention of some provision of the
Martin Hogg
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regulations, then the person’s liability to pay that compensation is not
affected by his liability to pay a fine for the selfsame contravention.
24Such a cautious view is consistent with the approach taken in X v Bed-
fordshire and previous cases. This judgment reinforces a judicial unwill-
ingness to create private liability for breach of statutory duty where the
existence of such liability can be said to rest only on a vague statutory
provision hinting, on one interpretation, at such liability but, on another
equally plausible interpretation, at compensation under the legislation
rather than at common law.
6. Reid v EWS Railways, Sheriffdom of Lothian & Borders, at
Edinburgh, 6 August 2010, Reported on LexisNexis as (2010)
Scot (D) 12/8: Injured Workman Unable to Prove that
Medical Condition Caused by his Working Conditions
a) Brief Summary of the Facts
25The pursuer was a workman employed by the defenders, a railway com-
pany. His duties involved manually closing railway carriage doors after
coal had been discharged from the carriages. The pursuer developed a
medical condition known as plantar fascitis (an inflammation of tissue at
the base of the foot) which he claimed was caused by the strain of his work,
and he sued the defenders for alleged breach of statutory regulations
relating to manual handling operations. The defenders admitted breach
of the regulations, but denied that such breach had caused the pursuer’s
condition: plantar fascitis was, they argued, an age-related condition, and
that the pursuer had been at significant risk of contracting the condition
given his age and his existing physical characteristics. At first instance, the
Sheriff held that the pursuer’s employment conditions had ‘accelerated
the condition’ by a few months, but that it would have developed in any
event. For such acceleration the Sheriff awarded damages totalling
£7,376. Both parties appealed against the decision to the Sheriff Principal.
b) Judgment of the Court
26The Sheriff Principal refused the pursuer’s appeal, allowed the cross-
appeal, and absolved the defenders. The present facts did not amount to
one of those which would trigger the exception set out in Fairchild v
Scotland
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Glenhaven9 to the usual test for causation-in-fact (the ‘but for’ or sine qua
non test). Applying therefore the ordinary rules on causation, the Sheriff
had been right to conclude that the evidence did not indicate that the
pursuer’s work activities were the probable cause of the condition from
which he suffered. However, the Sheriff had then gone too far in conclud-
ing that such work had nonetheless accelerated the pursuer’s condition:
all that the evidence indicated was that there were a number of possible
causes of the pursuer’s plantar fascitis, namely his work duties (whichmay
or may not have involved the defender’s breach of duty), limited ankle
dorsiflexion (a pre-existing physical condition from which he suffered),
and age-related degeneration. Given these multiple possible causes, causa-
tion had not been made out.
c) Commentary
27 The decision of the Sheriff Principle considers the application of the
Fairchild principle to a case where each of multiple possible causes of
different types were potential causes of an injury. As Fairchild and later
cases10 indicate, where causation cannot be established on an ordinary ‘but
for’ basis, a limited exception operates in circumstances of causal indeter-
minacy to permit an increase in risk to constitute a factor sufficient to
indicate that something caused the loss of a chance of avoiding an injury.
However, this exceptional route can only operate where the various
possible causes of an injury all operate in a similar way – where the
mechanism by which they operate is different (as was the case with the
three factors identified in this case), there is no room for the operation of
the Fairchild/Barker exception. That conclusion is correctly reached by the
Sheriff Principal, though his summary of the recent developments in the
field of causation is not always expressed entirely accurately: for instance,
his suggestion that Fairchild is an exceptional way to demonstrate causa-
tion of loss ignores the fact that the Fairchild decision, which revisited
McGhee v NCB, was itself revisited in Barker v Corus in such a way that,
where the exception now applies, it is taken to mean that a claimant
caused the loss of a chance of avoiding injury, not (as the Sheriff Principal
seems to suggest) the injury itself. Fairchild (modified by Barker) is thus not
really an exceptional way of proving a causal connection to an injury, but
rather an exceptional route which allows a claimant who cannot prove a
9 [2002] UKHL 22.
10 Such as Barker v Corus [2006] AC 572.
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causal connection to an injury to claim instead for a loss of a chance of
avoiding the injury. Such an exceptional claim was unavailable in the
present action, where the presence of multiple possible causes of different
types was reminiscent of the facts in the unsuccessful action of Wilsher v
Essex Area Health Authority.11
7. Hines v King Sturge LLP [2010] Court of Session Inner House
(CSIH) 86: Damages Claim by Tenant against Owner’s
Property Agent in Respect of Fire Damage Caused by Agent’s
Negligent Supervision of Leased Premises
a) Brief Summary of the Facts
28The two appellants operated businesses from leased premises in Glasgow
which were heavily damaged by a fire which began on the first appellant’s
premises. The respondents were a property management company who
had been contractually engaged by the owner of the building to manage
the building. The appellants argued that the respondents had failed to
maintain properly the fire alarm system for the building, with the result
that it had failed to activate when the fire commenced. They further
argued that this failure was in breach of a duty of care which the
respondents owed to the appellants as tenants of the building. They sued
the respondents in damages for the losses caused by the fire. At first
instance, the appellant’s claims were dismissed by the Outer House of the
Court of Session on the basis that no duty of care had been owed by the
respondents to the tenants. The tenants appealed to the Inner House.
b) Judgment of the Court
29The Inner House of the Court of Session overturned the dismissal of the
claims, and ordered a proof before answer (a trial of the facts, before a
determination of the relevant law) on the whole case. The judgments of
the appeal court focused on the applicability of the tripartite test for the
existence of a duty of care in delict laid out by the House of Lords in Caparo
Industries plc v Dickman12 to the facts of the case before them.
11 [1988] AC 1074.
12 [1990] 2 AC 605.
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c) Commentary
30 The case raises the perennially difficult issue of when responsibility will
arise in delict for property damage suffered by a pursuer with whom a
defender may have had little or no direct contact. While in a case such as
this the property agent may well have broken a contractual duty owed to
its client (the owner of the property), it is far from clear that it ought to be
held to come under any additional duty in delict to tenants of the build-
ing, who may conceivably have a contractual claim against the owner or
indeed a delictual claim against the particular tenant on whose property
the fire began.
31 In the leading judgment of the Inner House (delivered by Lord Osborne),
there is a lengthy discussion of the proper test to be applied in determin-
ing the liability, if any, of the managing agent: was it (following White v
Jones) one of testing a ‘special relationship’ between the parties?; was it ‘the
extended Hedley Byrne test’ of reliance?; or was it the ‘tripartite test’ of
Caparo? Were, moreover, these three tests ‘distinct alternatives’ which
might be tried in turn? Lord Osborne thought that they were not alter-
natives (see discussion at para 45 of his judgment), commenting rather
that ‘[i]t appears to me that, in order to achieve justice in widely differing
situations, the courts have devised different tests apt to the particular
situations with which they were dealing. In these circumstances, the
problem is to reach a view as to which of the several tests is in fact
appropriate to the kind of circumstances with which the court has to
deal.’ In so stating, Lord Osborne quoted in support a lengthy passage
from the speech of Lord Mance in Customs and Excise Commissioners v
Barclays Bank,13 and concluded that ‘this passage indicates that the rela-
tionship between the different tests is not simple and that they cannot
properly be seen as strict alternatives the one to the other’ (para 45). Lord
Osborne considered that ‘the Caparo test is a useful guide in the circum-
stances of this case’, holding that the element of reasonable foreseeability
was present (para 48), proximity might well also be so (para 49), as also the
fairness, justice and reasonability of holding a duty of care to be present
(para 53).
32 The view that there are different tests for the establishment of a duty of
care cannot go unchallenged. This view is not supported by earlier
authority, and its adoption leads to undesirable results when applied by
Lord Osborne to the facts of the case before him: for instance, his Lordship
13 [2007] 1 AC 181.
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felt, when mentioning the fact that heavy reliance appears to have been
placed by the appellants upon the proper management of the fire alarm
system by the respondents, that he was in mentioning this fact somehow
departing from matters relevant to the tripartite Caparo test, focusing
instead on the Hedley Byrne test. Yet reliance is simply one way of demon-
strating the relationship of proximity between parties required in the
Caparo test. That this is so emphasises that the Caparo approach should not
be seen as a different sort of approach to establishing a duty of care to that
adopted in Hedley Byrne. On the contrary, an orthodox view of the devel-
opment of this field of delict would posit that both the Donoghue v
Stevenson focus on reasonable foreseeability of harm, as well as the Hedley
Byrne focus on reliance, are both elements that were subsequently gath-
ered into the later, more developed, tripartite test expounded in Caparo.
One gets the impression that Lord Osborne was led by counsel in the case
to adopting a view that the various approaches of earlier cases disclosed
different tests for a duty of care, whereas the better view is surely that
these earlier cases were merely staging posts along the road of the devel-
opment of the comprehensive test expounded in Caparo, a comprehensive
test which subsumes within it earlier elements of relevance to the question
of whether such a duty should exist. Certainly, the passage from the
speech of Lord Mance quoted by Lord Osborne makes no reference to
separate tests for a duty of care, but merely to different ‘denominators’
whichmay be relevant in particular cases for testing whether a duty of care
should be said to arise.
33So, whileHines is a noteworthy decision applying the Caparo reasoning to a
case of property damage caused by improper management of tenanted
property by a third party, the suggestion of Lord Osborne that there are
three different tests for the establishment of a duty of care (a suggestion
which is also made by another of the judges, Lord Carloway) is somewhat
suspect, though seemingly encouraged by the pleadings of counsel before
the court. As a ‘proof before answer’ was ordered, we do not have (as yet)
any final determination of whether any duty of care did rest upon the
respondents in the case. On that specific question, Lord Carloway was
much less encouraging in his judgment, making the point that there is ‘an
obvious need for certainty in the field of commercial, and indeed other,
leases. Parties to a property relationship will seek to define their rights
and responsibilities by reference to the terms, express or implied, of their
leases. Were they to do otherwise, there is a substantial risk of “unaccept-
able circumvention” of established principles of the law of contract’ (para
75), a point concerning the ‘primacy of contract’ which, though it has
become somewhat unfashionable of late (following decisions such asWhite
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v Jones), may yet sway the court when a final determination of liability is
made in this case.
8. Personal Injury
34 One major theme running through many of the personal injury cases in
2010 has been the importance of carrying out risk assessment exercises:
these have now become standard for many employers and other parties,
and this is reflected in the way that courts routinely refer to whether or not
such exercises, properly carried out, would have disclosed a course of
action that a defender ought to have undertaken but did not.
35 Such risk assessment language features heavily in the decision of the Outer
House in Brown v North Lanarkshire Council,14 a tragic case of a child who
suffered severe brain damage when he fell onto a sharp paintbrush in a
school classroom, the paintbrush being forced through his eyeball and
into his brain (the case generated some media interest: see, for instance,
this report on the BBC website15). The court in this action held that a
proper risk assessment by the school would have indicated that there was
an evident risk of injury which could easily have been minimised by
alternative courses of conduct which the school failed to adopt (such as
the use of other, less sharp, types of paintbrush). Risk assessment was also
discussed by the court in another Outer House decision which generated a
lot of media attention,16 Valentine v Ministry of Defence,17 another case of a
tragic accident, in which a soldier serving in Iraq was crushed to death
when a trench in which he was working at his army base collapsed upon
him. Lord Bonomy, finding the defender liable in damages, held that the
deceased soldier’s superiors had failed to carry out an adequate risk
assessment in relation to the work which the soldier had undertaken,
and had in consequence breached the common law duty of care which they
owed to the soldier. Discussion of the failure to carry out a proper risk
assessment may also be seen in another judgment of Lord Bonomy,
Johnstone v Amec Construction Ltd,18 concerning a security guard injured
when he tripped over a barrier fence which had blown over.
14 [2010] CSOH 156.
15 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/glasgow_and_west/8391687.stm>.
16 See eg <http://thescotsman.scotsman.com/wariniraq/Justice-for-soldier- -buried.
6161311.jp>.
17 [2010] CSOH 40, 2010 SLT 473.
18 [2010] CSIH 57.
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36Moving beyond the field of risk assessment, one judgment19 considered
the infrequently arising question of whether a personal damages action
ought to have been withdrawn from jury trial. Civil jury trials are un-
common in Scotland, only being available in the Court of Session. In this
case, the appeal court held that the judge at first instance had improperly
withdrawn the case from jury trial: while the Lord Ordinary appeared to
have taken the view that no negligence had been established and therefore
that no reasonable jury could have found fault on the part of the defender,
the appeal court decided that, though it might have been that the jury
would have agreed with the Lord Ordinary, there was some evidence upon
which the jury could have found the defender at fault. That being so, the
matter should have remained one for the jury.
37In a significant Outer House judgment touching on the purpose of a
statute and the relevance of the Human Rights Act 1998 in interpreting
the application of statutory provisions, Lord Pentland held in Mykoliw v
Botterill20 that the provisions of the Damages (Scotland) Act 1976 should be
construed in such a way that a step-parent who had accepted a deceased
person as a child of the family was an entitled ‘relative’ under the Act and
thus able to claim damages in respect of the deceased’s wrongful death. In
so interpreting the Act, Lord Pentland held that the defender’s contrary
position would lead to an ‘absurd and unjust’ position, that the position
argued for by the pursuer must have been the intention of the Scottish
Parliament when it amended (albeit ambiguously) the provisions of the
Act in 2006, and that the Human Rights Act 1998 required the 1976 Act to
be interpreted in a way which was compatible with the pursuer’s Conven-
tion Rights, especially his art 8 right to family life.
38Notice ought also be taken of the decision of the Inner House in Wilson v
Excel UK Ltd,21 in which the court held that an employee who had, for a
prank, pulled a fellow employee’s ponytail, causing her injury, had not
been acting in the course of his employment, so that his employer could
not be vicariously liable for the delict committed. It is worth noting that,
in reaching his decision, the Lord President referred to ‘seminal judg-
ments’ of the Supreme Court of Canada in the field of vicarious liability, as
it is not often that judgments of the Canadian courts are cited in Scottish
actions.
19 Stainsby v Fallon [2010] CSIH 64.
20 [2010] CSOH 84.
21 [2010] CSIH 35, 2010 SLT 671.
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39 To finish on a somewhat comic (albeit unfortunate) note, the decision of
the Outer House in Wallace v Glasgow City Council22 makes the (fairly
obvious, one would have thought) point that it is contributorily negligent
for the user of a lavatory to stand on the lavatory bowl after use in order to
open a window. The pursuer in this action, a teacher at a Glasgow local
authority school, had done just this, and had been injured when the
lavatory bowl had been wrenched free and toppled over, causing the
teacher to be injured. As the court pointed out, there were other reason-
able courses of action which the teacher might have taken in order to
achieve her purpose (for instance, using a window pole to open the
window) rather than standing precariously on the edge of the lavatory
bowl. Holding that the school had not breached any duty of care owed to
the teacher (noting that, to return to an earlier topic, a satisfactory risk
assessment would have been unlikely to have disclosed the risk of lavatory
users standing on the bowl in order to open a window), the court added
that, even had the school been negligent, the teacher would have been
50 % contributorily negligent for her own injuries. So, remember the tale
of Mrs Wallace the next time you are tempted to stand on the loo.
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